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JUNK SCIENCE, DAUBERT, AND OHIO RULE 702
Paul C. Giannelli
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
Currently, the role of expert witnesses is under vigorous
attack. Peter Huber coined the phrase "junk science" to
describe judicial acceptance of unreliable expert testimony. Huber, Ga/ileo's Revenge: Junk SCience in the
Courtroom (1991). Huber's most sensational example
involved a "soothsayer" who "with the backing of expert
testimony from a doctor and several police department
officials" won a million dollar jury award for the loss of
her "psychic powers following a CAT scan." /d. at 3-4.
Huber is by no means alone in his criticism. Articles
such as Fanning, "Experts up to here," Forbes, July 13,
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Witnesses," Fortune, Sept. 25, 1989, at 133, are not
uncommon. Moreover, judicial opinions contain similar
censure. One court argued that "it is time to take hold of
expert testimony in federal trials" and "experts whose
opinions. are available to the highest bidder have no
place testifying in a court of law." In re Air Crash Disaster
at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986).
The "junk science" controversy even became a political issue. President Bush's Council on Competitiveness,
chaired by former Vice President Quayle, established a
Federal Civil Justice Reform Task Force. "Agenda For
Civil Justice Reform in America," reprinted in 60 U. Gin.
L. Rev. 977 (1992). Among other things, the Task Force
targeted expert testimony. Quayle declared: "We think it
is time to reject the notion that 'junk science' is truly relevant evidence." ':Junk Science or Junk Law?," 3 The
Expert Witness J. (Aug./Sept. 1991). Following the
recommendation of the Task Force, President Bush
imposed, by executive order, stringent requirements for
the admissibility of expert testimony. on government
attorneys in civil cases. Civil Justice Reform, Exec. Order
No. 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195 (1991). Under this order,
to be admissible a scientific theory must be "widely
accepted," which is defined as acceptance by at least a
substantial minority of experts in the relevant field.
CRIMINAL CASES
For the most part, the "junk science" debate has
gnored criminal litigation. Giannelli, "The ~Junk Science
)ebate': The Criminal Cases," 84 J. Grim. L. & Criminolo~y 105 (1993). The failure to ta~e.account of criminal
hief Public Defender James A. Draper ·
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prosecutions led to some remarkable results. While
President Bush's executive order required U.S. attorneys
in civil cases to meet a heightened admissibility standard
("wide acceptance") when introducing scientific
evidence, federal prosecutors were left free in the DNA
cases to argue for a lower standard, "urg[ing] that Rule
702 creates a liberal rule of admissibility which now
supersedes Frye." United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56,
59 (8th Cir. 1990), reh'g granted, vacated (en bane) after
death of defendant, 925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1991). See
also United States v. Vee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 188 (N.D. Ohio
1991) (prosecutors argued that Frye has been displaced),
aff'd sub nom., United States v. Bonds, 1993 U.S. App.
Lexis 32574 (6th Cir. Dec. 15, 1993).
Similarly, while Vice President Quayle was championing the virtues of expanded discovery in civil litigation,
federal prosecutors were opposing discovery in the first
major DNA case using the FBI procedure. In United
States v. Vee, 129 F.R.D. 629 (N.D. Ohio 1990), the
government opposed discovery of matching criteria,
environmental insult studies, population data, and
proficiency tests.
DAUBERT v. MERREll DOW PHARMACEUTICALS
In June 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993), waded into this controversy. The Court rejected
the "general acceptance" test, as set forth in Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), as the admissibility standard for scientific evidence. In its place, the
Court substituted a reliability analysis. The initial
commentary on the decision suggests that the
controversy surrounding the Frye rule will not subside in
the near future:
"Astonishingly, all parties expressed satisfaction with
the Daubert decision -the lawyers for the plaintiff and
defense, and scientists who wrote amicus briefs."
Foster et al., "Policy Forum: Science and the Toxic
Tort," 261 Science 1509, 1614 (Sept. 17, 1993).
"The catch ... is that no one is exactly sure what the
new standard is:' Stewart, ''A New Test: Decision
Creates Uncertain Future for Admissibility of Expert
Telephone (216) 443-7223
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Testimony," A.B.A. J. 48, 48 (Nov.1993).
"[T]he opinion of the court, in rejecting the existing
standard, has created considerable confusion." Dyk &
Castanias, "Daubert Doesn't End Debate on Experts,"
Nat'l L.J. 17, 17 (Aug. 2, 1993).
This article examines one aspect of the controversy
over scientific evidence -the evidentiary standard for
admitting novel scientific evidence.
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
The reliability of evidence derived from a scientific
theory or principle depends upon three factors:
(1) the validity of the underlying theory,
(2) the validity of the technique applying that theory,
and
(3) the proper application of the technique on a particular occasion. 1 Giannelli & lmwinkelried, Scientific
Evidence§ 1-1 (2d ed. 1993).
The first two factors -the validity of the underlying
theory and the validity of the technique- are distinct
issues. One could accept, for example, the validity of the
premise underlying "voiceprint" identification- voice
uniqueness - but still question whether the voiceprint
technique can identify that uniqueness. Similarly, the
underlying psychological and physiological principles of
polygraph testing could be acknowledged without
endorsing the proposition that a polygraph examiner can
detect deception by means of the polygraph technique.
The third requirement- the proper application of a
scientific technique on a particular occasion - raises a
number of issues: (a) the condition of any instrumentation used in the technique, (b) adherence to proper
procedures, and (c) the qualifications of both the person
conducting the procedure and the person interpreting
the results. The courts are divided over whether the
proponent of scientific evidence must establish these
factors as a condition of admissibility. /d. § 1-8.
The validity of a scientific principle and the validity of
the technique applying that principle may be established
in a number of ways: judicial notice, legislative recognition, stipulation, or the presentation of evidence.

Judicial Notice
The principles underlying many scientific techniques,
including radar, intoxication tests, fingerprints, palm
prints, firearms identification, handwriting comparisons,
as well as other procedures, have all been recognized by
judicial notice. /d. § 1-2. See also Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at
2796 n. 11 (1993) ("[T)heories that are so firmly established as to have attained the status of scientific law,
such as the laws of thermodynamics, properly are
subject to judicial notice under Fed. Rule Evid. 201.").
Courts, however, do not always use the term "judicial
notice" to express acceptance of a scientific technique.
For example, in State v. Pierce, 64 Ohio St.3d 490, 597
N.E.2d 107 (1992), the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the
admissibility of DNA evidence. At one point, the Court
wrote: "No pretrial evidentiary hearing is necessary to
determine the reliability of the DNA evidence." /d. at 501.
The Court, in effect, is taking judicial notice of the
reliability of DNA evidence, which means that the
general validity of DNA typing need not be proved in
future cases.

Statutory Recognition
In some cases the validity of a scientific technique is
recognized by statute. At one time most of these provisions involved motor vehicle codes and paternity cases;
for example, radar, intoxication tests, and blood tests are ,
often subject to legislative regulation. These techniques
are typically subject to judicial notice as well.
Recent enactments, however, have extended legislative recognition to more controversial techniques- for
example, polygraph, hypnosis, DNA, rape trauma
syndrome, and battered wife syndrome evidence. Many
of these techniques would not be subject to judicial
notice. Giannelli & lmwinkelreid, supra, § 1"3.
The interpretation of these statutes may raise constitutional questions. For example, in State v. Vega, 12 Ohio
St. 3d 185, 465 N.E.2d 1303 (1984), the Ohio Supreme
Court held that once a scientific technique (intoxilyzer)
has been legislatively recognized "an accused may not
make a general attack upon the reliability and validity of
the breath testing instrument." /d. at 190. Accord Columbus v. Day, 24 Ohio App. 3d 173, 174, 493 N.E.2d 1002,
1003 (1985).
This is wrong. It is one thing to legislate the admission
of a certain type of evidence, it is quite another thing to
preclude the accused from attacking such evidence.
Federal and Ohio Evidence Rule 104(e) provide that a
judge's ruling on admissibility does not limit the "right of
a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to
weight or credibility." In Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683
(1986), the U.S. Supreme Court cited Rule 104(e) in holding that a trial judge's decision to admit a confession
does not deprive an accused of the right to contest the
reliability of the confession before the jury. According to
the Court, a contrary rule deprives the accused of a fair
trial: "Whether rooted directly in the Due Process
Clause ... or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment ... , the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense.' " /d. at 690
(quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)).
Several courts have accepted this constitutional argument in scientific evidence cases. E.g., Barcott v. Dept. of
Public Safety, 741 P.2d 226, 228-29 (Alaska 1987); People
v. Thompson, 265 Cal. Rptr. 105, 109 (Cal. App. 1989);
State v. Lowther, 740 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Hawaii 1987). See
also lmwinkelried & Scofield, "The Recognition of an
Accused's Constitutional Right to Introduce Expert
Testimony Attacking the Weight of Prosecution Science
Evidence: The Antidote for the Supreme Court's Mistaken
Assumption in California v. Trombetta," 33 Ariz. L. Rev.
59 (1991).
Stipulation
The validity of a scientific technique also may be
established by stipulation. For example, many courts
admit polygraph evidence if the prosecution and defense
stipulate prior to trial that the results of the polygraph
examination are admissible. State v. Souel, 53 Ohio St.3d
123, 372 N.E.2d 1318 (1978).
As one court has noted: '[T]he primary effect of the
stipulation is that it operates as a waiver of objection or
challenge to the validity of the basic theory of polygraph
graph testing and eliminates the necessity of or the
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opportunity for the parties to establish a foundation in
each case to satisfy the trial court of the basic theory and
validity of polygraphs." State v. Dean, 307 N.W.2d 628;
637 (Wis. 1981).

tific evidence. The D.C. Circuit has stated: "The requirement of general acceptance in the scientific. community
assures that those most qualified to assess the general
validity of a scientific method will have a determinative
voice." United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44
(D.C. Cir. 1974). See also People v. Barbara, 255 N.W.2d
171, 194 (Mich. 1977) (Frye "permits the experts who
know most about a procedure to experiment and to study
it. In effect, they form a kind of technical jury, which must
first pass on the scientific status of a procedure before
the lay jury utilizes it in making its findings of fact.").

Evidence
A novel scientific technique is rarely so well established that a court would take judicial notice of its validity
the first time evidence derived from the technique is
offered at trial. Statutory recognition or stipulation are
even less likely. Accordingly, the validity of a new technique is typically established through the introduction of
evidence, including expert testimony. Offers of proof,
affidavits, stipulations, and learned treatises may also be
considered. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224,
1241 (3d Cir. 1985).
Courts have employed several different tests to determine admissibility in this context. In addition to Frye and
Daubert, some courts have adopted a "relevancy"
approach, while others have adopted a "Frye plus" test.

Criticism
Notwithstanding its widespread judicial adoption,
commentators have criticized Frye. Professor Strong
commented that Frye "tends to obscure ... proper
considerations by asserting an undefinable general
acceptance as the principal if not sole determinative
factor." Strong, "Questions Affecting the Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence," 1970 U. Ill. L.F. 1, 14. Another
commentator identified Frye's "main drawbacks [as] its
inflexibility, confusion of issues, and superfluity." McCormick, "Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to
Admissibility," 67 Iowa l. Rev. 879, 915 (1982).
Accordingly, in recent years an increasing number of
courts rejected the general acceptance test. The federal
cases include: United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786;
794 (2d Cir. 1992) (DNA evidence), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 104 (1992); United States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985, 988
(3d Cir. 1985) (innersole shoe comparison), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1172 (1986); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d
1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985) (psychological testimony on
eyewitness identifications); United States v. Williams,
583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) (voiceprints), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
A number of state courts have also rejected Frye. E.g.,
Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Ark. 1991) (DNA
evidence); Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del.
1980) (semen test), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 (1982);
State v. Montalbo, 828 P.2d 1274, 1280 (Hawaii 1992)
(DNA evidence); State v. Rodgers, 812 P.2d 1208, 1210
(Idaho 1991) (blood spatter analysis); State v. Hall, 297
N.W.2d 80, 85 (Iowa 1980) (blood flight characteristics),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981); State v. Williams, 388
A.2d 500, 504 (Me. 1978) (voiceprints); Kelly v. State, 824
S.W.2d 568, 571-72 (Tex. Grim. App. 1992) (DNA
evidence); O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 364 S.E.2d 491,504
(Va.) (multisystem electrophoretic blood test), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988).
The U.S. Supreme Court joined this trend in Daubert.
According to the Court, "[t]hat austere standard [Frye],
absent from and incompatible with the Federal Rules of
Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials." 113 S.
Ct. at 2794.

FRYE: THE GENERAL ACCEPTANCE TEST
In Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), the
D.C. Circuit considered the admissibility of polygraph
evidence as a case of first impression. The court wrote:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses
the line between the experimental and demonstrable
stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight
zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs. /d. at 1014.
fhe court went on to hold that the polygraph had "not yet
~ained such standing and scientific recognition among
Jhysiological and psychological authorities." /d. Thus, it
s not enough that a qualified expert, or even several
~xperts, testifies that a particular technique is valid. Frye
mposes a special burden: the technique must be gene rIlly accepted by the relevant scientific community.
Vlajority Rule
In the ensuing years, Frye's general acceptance stanlard became the majority rule in this country. See United
)tates v. Skeens, 494 F.2d 1050, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
Frye "has been followed uniformly in this and other
;ircuits."); Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (Md. 1978)
"This criterion of 'general acceptance' in the scientific
:ommunity has come to be the standard in almost all the
:ourts in the country which have considered the question
1f the admissibility of scientific evidence.").
In addition to polygraph evidence, Frye has been used
J determine the admissibility of evidence derived from
oiceprint analysis, neutron activation analysis, gunshot
9sidue tests, bite mark comparisons, psycholinguistics,
·uth serum, scanning electroo microscopic analysis,
ypnosis, blood analysis, hair analysis, intoxication testlg, DNA profiling, rape trauma syndrome, and numerus other forensic techniques.
The principal justification for the general acceptance
tandard is that it tends to ensure the reliability of scien-

Ohio Rule on Scientific Evidence
Ohio was also one of these states. In State v. Williams,
4 Ohio St.3d 53, 446 N.E.2d 444 (1983), a case involving
the admissibility of voiceprints, the Ohio Supreme Court
rejected the Frye test. According to the Court, "the Rules
of Evidence establish adequate preconditions for admissibility of expert testimony, and we leave to the discretion
of this state's judiciary, on a case by case basis, to decide
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whether the questioned testimony is relevant and will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue." /d. 58. This leaves the trial
court without much guidance.
The Court recently reaffirmed this position in State v.
Pierce, 64 Ohio St.3d 490, 597 N.E.2d 107 (1992), which
admitted DNA evidence: "This court in Williams rejected
the Frye standard, preferring a more flexible approach."
/d. at 496. The Court elaborated:
The standard for the admissibility of scientific
evidence in Ohio as found in State v. Williams is whether the questioned evidence is relevant and will assist
the trier of fact in understanding evidence presented or
in determining a fact in issue ... Any rebuttal evidence
goes to weight rather than admissibility. We, therefore,
hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the DNA evidence in this case. /d. at 497.
RELEVANCY TEST
Jettisoning Frye is one thing; replacing it with something that works is another. As Professor Rossi has
noted, "even if a court abandons the Frye test, the reliability issue must still be faced." Rossi, Expert Witnesses
34 (1991).
One alternative to Frye is to treat scientific evidence in
the same way as other evidence, weighing its probative
vaiue against countervailing dange;s and conside;ations.
Professor McCormick advocated this position. In his
1954 text, he wrote:
"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition
upon the court's taking judicial notice of scientific
facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence. Any relevant conclusions which are
supported by a qualified expert witness should be
received unless there are other reasons for exclusion.
Particularly, its probative value may be overborne by
the familiar dangers of prejudicing or misleading the
jury, unfair surprise and undue consumption of time.
McCormick, Evidence 363-64 (1954) (emphasis added).
This approach is not without problems. The probative
value of scientific evidence depends on its reliability. See
United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90,94-95 (E.D.
Mich. 1972) ("The acceptance of the basic theory [of the
polygraph] is a part of the process of making the
evidence relevant.").
However, since most trial judges do not possess the
scientific background to determine relevance/reliability,
the judge "will generally be forced to accept the probative value of the evidence as what a qualified expert testifies it to be." Strong, supra, at 22. In effect, qualifying the
expert presumptively qualifies the technique. Such an
approach provides an insufficient threshold standard for
admissibility. "[l]t seems questionable whether the
relevancy approach will adequately protect against the
misuse of unreliable scientific evidence." Giannelli, "The
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later," 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197,
1245 (1980).
Daubert implicitly rejects this approach.

reliability analysis. The Court based its decision on Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which is identical
to the Ohio rule. It reads:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise.
As noted above, the Court found the rule inconsistent
with Frye. However, the Court did not adopt McCormick's
lax relevancy st9ndard. Instead, the Court derived a reliability test from the phrase "scientific knowledge" in Rule
702. The Court commented:
[l]n order to qualify as "scientific knowledge," an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific
method. Proposed testimony must be supported by
appropri;:lte validation- i.e., "good grounds," based
on what is known. In short, the requirement that an
expert's testimony pertain to "scientific knowledge"
establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability. 113 S.
Ct. at 2795.
Under the Daubert analysis, the trial court determines
admissibility, a task that "entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether
that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied
to the facts in issue." /d. at 2796.

Enumerated Factors
According to Daubert, in performing this "gatekeeping
function," the trial court may consider a number of
factors. First, the court should determine whether the
scientific theory or technique has been tested. To
support its position, the Supreme Court cited authorities
on the philosophy of science: "[T]he statements
constituting a scientific explanation must be capable of
empirical test." Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science
49 (1966). "[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a
theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability."
Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of
Scientific Knowledge 37 (5th ed. 1989).
Second, whether a theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication is "a relevant,
though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the
scientific validity." Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797. The peer
review and publication process increases the likelihood
that flaws will be discovered.
Third, a technique's "known or potential rate of error"
is also a relevant factor. /d. As an example the Supreme
Court cited United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353-54
(7th Cir. 1989) (surveying studies of the error rates for
"voiceprints").
Fourth, the "existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique's operation" is another indicium of trustworthiness. 113 S. Ct. at 2797. As an example
the Court cited United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194,
1198 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting professional organization's
standards governing "voiceprints"), cert. denied, 439
u.s. 1117 (1979).
Finally, "general acceptance" remains a factor in
assessing reliability. Although the Court rejected "general acceptance" as the sole criterion for admissibility, it

DAUBERT: THE RELIABILITY APPROACH
In Daubertthe Supreme Court replaced Frye with a
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nients in several major respects." /d. at 996.
In United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir.
1990), reh'g granted, vacated en bane as moot after
defendant's death, 925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1991), the
Eighth Circuit adopted the Castro approach:
Because DNA evidence is so new and the resulting
prejudice to the defendant is sufficiently great, it is
imperative that the court satisfy itself that there exists a
sufficient foundational basis as to the overall admissibility of the evidence. This must be done before the
government exposes the jury to the lab results. /d. at 60.
The Second Circuit, however, rejected this approach in
United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992). The court referred to this
"elevated standard" as "even more stringent than that in
Frye." /d. at 794-95.

recognized its relevance in assessing the reliability of
scientific evidence: "Widespread acceptance can be an
important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible,
and 'a known technique that has been able to attract only
minimal support within the community' ... may properly
be viewed with skepticism." 113 S. Ct. at 2797 (citation
omitted).
Other Factors
The Supreme Court emphasized, however, that the
Rule 702 standard is "a flexible one." /d. The enumerated
factors are neither dispositive nor exhaustive. The Court
stated: "Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do
not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test." /d. at
2796. In an accompanying footnote, the Court wrote: "A
number of authorities have presented variations on the
reliability approach, each with its own slightly different
factors ... To the extent that they focus on the reliability
of evidence as ensured by the scientific validity of its
underlying principles, all these versions may well have
merit, although we express no opinion regarding any of
their particular details." /d. at 2797 n. 12.
In that footnote, the Court cited Judge Weinstein and
Professor Berger's treatise; those authors list the following factors:
(1) the technique's general acceptance in the field,
(2) the expert's qualifications and stature,
( 3) the use which has been made of the new technique,
( 4) the potential rate of error,
( 5) the existence of specialized literature,
(6) the novelty of the new invention, and
( 7) the extent to which the technique relies on the subjective interpretation of the expert. 3 Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 702-41 to -42 (1993).
The Court also cited McCormick, "Scientific Evidence:
Defining a New Approach to Admissibility," 67 Iowa
L.Rev. 879, 911-12 (1982) (listing 11 factors).

Misleading Label
As noted in the beginning of this article, the third prong
in Castro is a logical step in establishing the reliability of
scientific evidence. A valid technique improperly applied
will produce erroneous results. This requirement, however, predates the DNA cases. A number of courts had held
that the failure to establish adherence to proper procedures results in the exclusion of evidence: "It is widely
recognized that the party offering the results of laboratory tests must . .. vouch for its correct administration in
the particular case." United States v. Bruno, 333 F. Supp.
570, 574 (E. D. Pa. 1971) (chromatographic analysis of
ink). See also 1 Giannelli & lmwinkelried, supra, at 36
(listing cases involving polygraph, voiceprint, as well as
other types of scientific evidence that adopt this position).
Radar evidence is a good example. The reliability of
radar evidence depends on (1) the validity of the underlying theory (e.g., the Doppler effect), (2) the validity of the
technique applying that theory (e.g., the particular model
of radar), and (3) the proper application of the technique
on a particular occasion (e.g., use of tuning forks to calibrate).
Furthermore, this requirement need not be tied to the
Frye test. It could be required in a jurisdiction that rejects
Frye. Indeed, even after Daubertthe Eighth Circuit
continued to impose this requirement:
We believe that the reliability inquiry set forth in
Daubert mandates that there be a preliminary showing
that the expert properly performed a reliable methodology in arriving at his opinion .... In order to determine
whether scientific testimony is reliable, the court must
conclude that the testimony was derived from the
application of a reliable methodology or principle in the
particular case.
Thus, we conclude that the court should make an
initial inquiry into the particular expert's application of
the scientific principle or methodology in question. The
court should require the testifying expert to provide
affidavits attesting that he properly performed the
protocols involved in DNA profiling. United States v.
Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1197-98 (8th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 126 L.Ed.2d 697 (1994).
Compliance with the third prong can be decided only
on a case by case basis. See National Academy of
Sciences, DNA Technology in Forensic Science 134

FRYE "PLUS"
Some commentators have argued there is a fourth
approach. They cite several DNA cases that have engrafted an additional requirement onto the Frye standard.
This approach has been labeled "Frye Plus." Goldberg,
"A New Day for DNA?," 78 A.B.A.J. 84,84 (Apr. 1992).

DNA Cases
For example, in People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985
:sup. Ct. 1989), the court set forth a three-pronged
:malysis. According to the court, the admissibility of DNA
~vidence depends upon a showing that (1) the underlying
heory has been generally accepted, (2) the procedures
mplementing the theory have been generally accepted,
md (3) the testing laboratory has followed these pro;edures./d. at 987. Because of the "complexity" of DNA
malysis and its "powerful impact" on a jury, the court
1eld that "passing muster under Frye alone is
nsufficient." /d.
The court further concluded that the prosecution had
•atisfied the first two prongs but not the third: "In a piercng attack upon each molecule of evidence presented,
he defense was successful in demonstrating to this
:ourt that the testing laboratory failed in its responsibility
J perform the accepted scientific techniques and experi-
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(1992) (This assumption- "that the analytical work done
for a particular trial comports with proper procedurecan be resolved only case by case and is always open to
question, even if the general reliability of DNA typing is
fully accepted in the scientific community"). This issue,
therefore, is never subject to judicial notice.
DAUBERT'S EFFECT ON THE STATES
Daubert's effect on state jurisdictions depends on
several factors. Daubert rests on an interpretation of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, a federal statute. The Court
stated: "We interpret the legislatively-enacted Fe-deral
Rules of Evidence as we would any statute." Daubert, 113
S. Ct. at 2793.

No Difference

Non-Frye Jurisdictions

Finally, even if a jurisdiction adopts Daubert, a scientific
techniqlJe's admissibility status may not change. Some
commentators have argued that "[i]n practice ... courts
today all tend to admit the same evidence whether or not
they purport to apply the Frye standard." Weinstein, "Improving Expert Testimony," 20 U. Rich. L. Rev. 473, 478 (1986).
This view, however, is suspect. Frye played a determinative role in the voiceprint cases. As several courts
have observed: "[W]hen the Frye test has been applied,
courts have tended to exclude expert voice identification
evidence based on spectrography. The courts are equally likely to admit the evidence when the Frye test is not
applied." State v. Free, 493 So. 2d 781, 785 (La. App.
1986), cert. denied, 499 So.2d 83 (1987). See also State v.
Gortarez, 686 P.2d 1224, 1236 n.6 (Ariz 1984)("Some
courts following the Frye rule, refuse to allow spectrographic evidence ... Other courts, generally following
modifications of Frye or not mentioning it at aii, have
allowed spectrographic evidence.").
With other techniques, however, the admissibility standard has not made a difference. For example, no reported case has excluded bite mark comparisons, including
courts that applied the general acceptance standard,
e.g., United States v. Martin, 13 M.J. 66, 67-68 (C. M.A.
1982); People v. Middleton, 429 N.E.2d 100, 103-04 (N.Y.
1981), and those courts that employed other analyses.
E.g., Handley v. State, 515 So. 2d 121, 130-,31 (Ala. Grim.
App. 1987); Spence v. State, 795 S.W.2d 743, 750-,52
(Tex. Grim. App. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 932 (1991).
Similarly, courts in non-Frye jurisdictions have excluded
evidence based on controversial techniques. For example
in State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751 (Or. 1984) (en bane), the '
Oregon Supreme Court rejected the Frye test, but then
went on to exclude polygraph evidence under the
Oregon Rules of Evidence. The court wrote: "Notwithstanding the usual deference to trial court discretion, we
as an appellate court retain our role to determine the
admissibility of scientific evidence under the Oregon
Evidence Code." /d. at 775.
The Delaware Supreme Court spurned Frye but nevertheless excluded hypnotically-refreshed testimony under
the Delaware Rules. State v. Davis, 490 A.2d 601, 605
(Del. 1985) ("[T]he State has not demonstrated that hypnotic
recall is sufficiently reliable to be admitted as evidence ...").
The same result has occurred in several truth serum
cases. See Zeigler v. State, 402 So. 2d 365, 373 (Fla. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035 (1982); Harper v. State, 292
S.E.2d 389, 395-96 (Ga. 1982) (rejecting Frye rule but
nevertheless excluding truth serum evidence as unreliable).

Daubert's influence on jurisdictions that had previously
jettisoned Frye is also uncertain. As noted earlier, a
substantial number of jurisdictions, including Ohio, had
abandoned Frye before Daubert was decided. If such a

CODIFICATION
Daubert may provide the impetus to amend Federal
Rule 702 or its state counterparts. One commentary

Frye Jurisdictions

! .

jurisdiction had adopted McCormick's relevancy
approach, a shift to Daubert's reliability approach would
presumably result in a more demanding inquiry. The
Ohio Supreme Court seemed to make an independent
analysis of the reliability of DNA in Pierce, which would
be consistent with Daubert. It is less than clear, however,
that the Ohio Supreme Court intended the type of reliability inquiry envisioned by the U.S. Supreme Court.

As a statutory rather than a constitutional case,
Daubert is not binding on the states, which are therefore
free to continue to follow Frye. This is true even in the 35
jurisdictions that have adopted evidence rules based on
the Federal Rules. See Joseph & Saltzburg, The Federal
Rules of Evidence in the States iii (1992) (preface).
Two post-Daubert opinions illustrate this point. In one
case, the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected Frye in
favor of the Daubert approach. State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d
192 (N.M. 1993). In the other, the Arizona Supreme Court
deciined io foiiow Daubert, noting that it vvas "not bound
by the United States Supreme Court's non-constitutional
construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence when we
construe the Arizona Rules of Evidence." State v. Bible,
858 P.2d 1152, 1183 (Ariz. 1993) (excluding DNA probability evidence).
It would not be difficult for a state supreme court that
favored Frye to reject Daubert's statutory analysis. In
Bible the Arizona Supreme Court also remarked: "Our
rules ... are court-enacted. While the United States
Supreme Court considers congressional purpose, this
court- when construing a rule we have adopted- must
rely on text and our own intent in adopting or amending
the rule in the first instance." /d.
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted an
unpersuasive and much-criticized "plain meaning"
construction in interpreting the Federal Rules. See
Becker & Orenstein, "The Federal Rules of Evidence
After Sixteen Years- The Effect of 'Plain Meaning'
Jurisprudence, The Need for an Advisory Committee on
the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective
Revision of the Rules," 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 857, 863
(1992) (commenting on "the potential mischief that can
result from a rigid plain meaning analysis of the Rules");
Jonakait, "The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the
Changed Rules of Evidence," 68 Tex. L. Rev. 745, 786
(1990) ("Inevitably, ... the plain-meaning standard will
produce worse evidence law by freezing evidence into a
literalistic mold, by eliminating its dynamism, and by
mandating results without any attempt to satisfy the
policy goals of evidence law.").
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observed: "Daubert does not provide the easily applied,
objective and consistent test that many courts and litigants had hoped it would. This may well create pressures to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence." Dyk &
Castanias, "Daubert Doesn't End Debate on Experts,"
Nat'l L.J. 17, 20 (Aug. 2, 1993).

Scientific testimony. Testimony concerning scientific
matters, or testimony concerning the result of a scientific
procedure, test or experiment is admissible provided:
(1) there is general acceptance within the scientific
community of the validity of the theory or principle
underlying the matter, procedure, test or experiment;
(2) there is general acceptance within the relevant
scientific community that the procedure, test or experiment is reliable and produces accurate results; and
(3) the particular test, procedure or experiment was
conducted in such a way as to yield an accurate result.
Upon request of a party, a determination pursuant to
this subdivision shall be made before the commencement of trial. New York State Law Revision Comm'n, A
Code of Evidence for the State of New York (1991)
(submitted to the 1991-92 session of the Legislature by
Gov. Mario Cuomo).
In effect, this proposal codifies the Castro case; it adopts
the "Frye plus" approach.

The Federal Rules
In 1986 several commentators proposed amendments
to Rule 702. Professor Lederer proposed adding the
word "reliable" before the phrase "scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge" in Rule 702. Lederer,
"Resolving the Frye Dilemma: A Reliability Approach,"
26 Jurimetrics J. 240 (1986).
Professor Berger proposed adding a second sentence
to the rule: "When the witness seeks to testify about a
scientific principle or technique that has not previously
been accorded judicial recognition, the testimony shall
be admitted if the court determines that its probative
value outweighs the dangers specified in Rule 403."
Berger, "A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific
Evidence," 26 Jurimetrics J. 245 (1986).
Professor Starrs proposed adding a second sentence
to Rule 702: "In the case of expert testimony based upon
a scientific theory or technique, the court shall find that
the theory or technique in question is scientifically valid
for the purposes for which it is tendered." Starrs, "Frye v.
United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal
to Amend Federal Evidence Ruie 702," 26 Jurimeirics J.
249 (1986). See also "Rules for Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence," 115 F. A.D. 79 (1987).
In 1991 the Civil Rules Committee proposed its own
amendment, which required expert testimony to be based
on "reasonably reliable" information. "Preliminary Draft
of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence," 137
F. A.D. 53, 156 (1991). This provision apparently embodies
a modified Frye rule. The drafting committee note states:
This standard "does not mandate a return to the strictures
of Frye v. United States. . .. However, the court is called
upon to reject testimony that is based upon premises
acking any significant support and acceptance within
:he scientific community .. ."/d. at 157.
The Bush Administration also proposed an amendnent to Rule 702. Its Task Force recommended three
;hanges: (1) expert testimony must "substantially" assist
he trier of fact (currently, it need only "assist"); (2) expert
estimony must be "based on a widely accepted explanaory theory"; and (3) experts are prohibited from acceptng contingent fees. "Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in
\merican," supra, at 1049.

Proposed Ohio Rule 702
A recent proposed amendment to Ohio Rule 702 tracks
the New York format, but does not adopt Frye. It reads:
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts. A witness may testify
as an expert if:
(A) the witness' testimony relates to matters beyond
the knowledge or experience possessed by lay
persons or dispels a misconception common among
lay persons;
(B) the witness is qualified as an expert by specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
regarding the subject matter of the testimony; and
(C) the witness' testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical, or other specialized information. To the
extent that the testimony reports the result of a procedure, test, or experiment, the testimony is reliable only if:
( 1 ) the theory upon which the procedure, test, or
experiment is based is objectively verifiable or is
validly derived from widely accepted knowledge,
facts, or principles;
(2) the design of the procedure, test, or experiment
reliably implements the theory; and
(3) the particular procedure, test, or experiment was
conducted in a way that will yield an accurate result.
66 Ohio Bar J. xliii (Oct. 18, 1993).
Rule 702(C)(1) of this proposal offers alternative ways to
establish the validity of a scientific theory; it may either
be "objectively verifiable" or "widely accepted." Rule
702(C)(3) addresses the "Frye plus" issue; the proponent
must establish that the technique was applied correctly
in the particular case.

>iate Rules of Evidence
There are few models in other jurisdictions. State
tdoptions of the Federal Rules are simply "silent regardlg the viability of Frye." 2 Joseph & Saltzburg, supra,
lule 702, at 17. Only Michigan has addressed the issue
xplicitly in the text of Rule 702; that rule requires expert
3stimony be based on "recognized" scientific, technical,
r other knowledge. Mich. A. Evid. 702.
A proposed New York rule provides the most detailed
xample, even though New York has yet to adopt the
ederal Rules. Proposed N.Y. R. Evid. 702(b) reads:

PRETRIAL DISCOVERY
The Frye-Daubert controversy should be understood in
a larger context. Another important development
concerning scientific evidence relates to a procedural,
rather than an evidentiary, rule. A recent amendment to
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective
Dec. 1, 1993) expands pretrial discovery by requiring the
prosecution to disclose a written summary of an expert's
testimony, including the expert's opinion, the bases for
the opinion, and the witness' qualifications. Fed. A. Grim.
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P. 16(a)(1)(E) now reads:
(E) Expert Witnesses: At the defendant's request, the
government shall disclose to the defendant a written
summary of testimony the government intends to use
under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence during its case in chief at trial. This summary
must describe the witnesses' opinions, the bases and
the reasons therefor, and the witnesses' qualifications.
As a matter of reciprocity, the amendment also applies to
the defense. Fed. R. Grim. P. 16(b){1)(C).
The necessity for discovery has long been recognized.
·The ABA Standards note: 'The need for full and fair
disclosure is especially apparent with respect to scientific
proof and the testimony of experts ... [l]t is virtually
impossible for evidence or information of this kind to be
distorted or misused because of its advance disclosure."
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ABA Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure
Before Trial66 (Approved Draft 1970). Similarly, the
National Academy of Sciences DNA report states: "The
prosecutor has a strong responsibility to reveal fully to
defense counsel and experts retained by the defendant
all material that might be necessary in evaluating the
evidence." National Research Council, DNA Technology
in Forensic Science 146 (1992).
No longer will the prosecution be able to disclose only
a laboratory report providing a mere summary of "the
results of an unidentified test conducted by an anonymous technician." United States v. Bentley, 875 F.2d
1114, 1123 (5th Cir. 1989) (Williams, J., dissenting). For a
further discussion of discovery, see Giannelli, "Criminal
Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA," 44 Vand. L.
Rev. 791 (1991).

